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Abstract:  
Why did Euro Area member state governments decide to move to Banking Union 
(BU) — presented by proponents as a crucial move to ‘complete’ Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) — only in 2012, over twenty years after the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty? Why has a certain design for BU been chosen and some elements 
of this design prioritised over others? This paper interrogates previous academic 
accounts on the move to and the design of EMU — neofunctionalist, 
intergovernmentalist and constructivist — evaluating their explanatory power with 
reference to BU. It is argued that the asymmetrical design of EMU generated a variety 
of spill-overs and, hence, a neofunctionalist drive to supranationalise control over 
bank supervision and financial support for banks as part of the so-called ‘completion’ 
of EMU. However, intergovernmental negotiations informed by moral hazard and 
domestic political economy concerns explain the asymmetrical design of BU agreed 
by national governments. 
 
Keywords: European Integration Theory, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
Banking Union (BU), Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM), European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In June 2012, the European Council and Euro Area summit agreed to complete 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) through the creation of ‘Banking Union’ 
(BU), which was to be based on four components: a single framework for banking 
supervision; a single framework for banking resolution; a common deposit guarantee 
scheme; and a common backstop for temporary financial support. In October 2013, 
the Council of Ministers approved the Regulation for the establishment of a Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). In July 2014, the Council of the European Union and 
the European Parliament approved the Regulation for the setting up of the Single 
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Resolution Mechanism (SRM) with the Single Resolution Board (SRB). The third and 
fourth elements — the planned European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) and the 
common backstop for temporary financial support — escaped agreement. The 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was established by the Euro Area member 
states in September 2012 to replace the temporary European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF). The Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and a number of 
member states wanted the ESM to provide financial support to ailing banks and to the 
SRM both in the context of fund mutualisation and beyond, but — the emergency 
recapitalisation of Spanish banks aside — there remains no agreement on the role of 
the ESM in BU to date and the mechanism remains an intergovernmental body 
outside the EU institutional framework.  
 
The proposals for BU amount to a radical initiative to stabilise the national banking 
systems exposed directly to the sovereign debt crisis. BU was also intended to reverse 
the fragmentation of European financial markets caused in large part by the crises. BU 
implied a significant transfer of powers from the national to the supranational level. 
Hence, the decision to create BU represented a major development in European 
economic governance and European integration history more generally. Why was BU 
— presented by proponents as a crucial move to ‘complete’ EMU — proposed in 
2012, over twenty years after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty? Why has a 
certain design for BU been chosen and some elements of this design prioritised over 
others? In order to answer these questions, this paper examines previous scholarly 
accounts and the theories that they apply to explain the move to and the design of 
EMU, evaluating their explanatory power in the case of BU. It is argued that an 
incomplete EMU generated a variety of spill-overs and a neofunctionalist dynamic 
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encouraging initiatives to ‘complete’ EMU. However, intergovernmental negotiations 
informed by both ideas and domestic political economy interests explain how an 
agreement was reached on BU and why a specific — in large part, but not entirely, 
German-directed — design for BU was agreed. We also argue that member state 
preferences and intergovernmental dynamics that shaped the making of EMU find 
their parallel in the making of BU.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the main theoretical approaches 
to the politics and political economy of the creation of EMU. It is argued that spill-
overs from the Single Market and from previous monetary integration, as well as a 
pro-active Commission, were the main drivers towards EMU. The ideational power of 
a price stability-oriented economic paradigm, and the structural / bargaining power of 
Germany largely accounts for the incompleteness of EMU and its asymmetric design. 
Section 3 assesses the extent to which the explanations put forward with reference to 
the establishment and design of EMU have analytical leverage with reference to the 
move towards BU and the design eventually agreed. It is argued that spill-overs from 
an incomplete EMU, as well as a pro-active ECB, were the main drivers towards BU. 
The structural / bargaining power of Germany and its preferences shaped by moral 
hazard concerns and domestic political economy considerations largely account for 
the incompleteness of BU and its asymmetric design. The penultimate section and 
conclusion compare the main explanations on the making of EMU and BU, consider 
their relative explanatory merit, and tease out some lessons for European economic 
governance. 
 
2. Explaining the making of EMU  
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A number of theoretical approaches in European integration studies, political science 
and political economy have been applied to explain the decision to move to EMU and 
the design of the EMU project, notably, versions of neofunctionalism, constructivism 
and intergovernmentalism (see Verdun 2002; Sadeh and Verdun 2009). Moreover, a 
number of political economy approaches have been applied to investigate the 
preferences of EU member states on the main components of EMU — namely, 
monetary policy, exchange rate policy, and fiscal policy — as well as the ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’ from EMU.  
 
A neofunctionalist or supranational governance approach understands the move to 
EMU as the result of spill-overs from previous market integration and monetary 
integration (see, for example, Sandholtz 1998; Jabko 1999). A major prior 
development was the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS), and 
specifically the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1979, which set in place a 
system of semi-fixed exchange rates among the participating countries. Furthermore, 
EU supranational authorities, above all Jacques Delors and a number of European 
Commission officials, played a strategic role in driving the project forward (see Jabko 
1999), by acting as policy entrepreneurs with the — either active or passive — 
support of many of Europe’s largest manufacturing companies. Economic spill-overs 
formed the core element of the official justification wielded by the European 
Commission to explain the need for EMU. The Commission and a number of 
federalist-minded economic policy officials in the member states and academic 
economists insisted that the gains of the Single Market could only be optimized with a 
single currency:  notably in the influential publication ‘One Market, One Money’ 
(Commission 1990). Following a similar reasoning, one euro-federalist Bank of Italy 
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official, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (1982), built on the Mundell-Fleming ‘unholy 
trinity’ of fixed exchange rates, full capital mobility and national monetary policies, 
by adding the Single Market — thus transforming the trinity into an ‘inconsistent 
quartet’ in the European Community (EC) context. As with the Commission, a 
number of economists also stressed the instability of the ERM of the EMS — 
especially given currency speculation — and the functional need to move from the 
ERM’s semi-fixed exchange rates to EMU (Giavazzi et al. 1989; De Grauwe 1990). 
On the one hand, these functionalist dynamics contribute to explaining the rationale 
for EMU. On the other hand, they do not shed light on the EMU design agreed by the 
member states in the early 1990s. On this we must turn to ideas and 
intergovernmental dynamics.  
 
A second approach that has been used to explain the move to and the design of EMU 
is constructivism (McNamara 1998; Marcussen 2000; Verdun 1999). There are 
several variations of constructivism, but what they all have in common is the 
explanatory power assigned to ideas, defined as a set of causal beliefs concerning a 
certain policy area, rather than material (mostly, economic) interests. Ideas-based 
constructivist accounts contrast with the interests-based approach of 
intergovernmentalist explanations. Thus, constructivist approaches emphasize the 
importance of socialisation in international or European fora as a mechanism that 
facilitated ideational convergence towards EMU. Alternatively, they focus on the 
instrumental role of ideas as, for example, ‘policy narratives’. Some ideational 
approaches to the move to and design of EMU have focused on the role of central 
bankers as an epistemic community supporting a stability-oriented design for EMU, 
based on central bank independence and anti-inflationary goals (Verdun 1999; 
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Marcussen 2000). Other works have considered a broader set of actors, not only 
central bankers, in the ideational convergence towards EMU. McNamara (1998) has 
traced the ‘currency of ideas’, that is the spread of the stability-oriented 
macroeconomic paradigm from Germany to other member states. Thus, ideational 
convergence among macroeconomic elites across the EU explains why it was possible 
to reach an agreement on EMU, as well as the specific ‘sound money’ and ‘sound 
public finance’ (Dyson 2000) design chosen for EMU. Finally, other works have 
applied a ‘strategic constructivism’ (Jabko 1999) by examining the instrumental use 
of ideas by the European Commission in order to promote EMU.  
 
The vast majority of research investigating the move to and the design of EMU has 
adopted an intergovernmentalist approach (Kaltenthaler 1998; Moravcsik 1998; 
Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Loedel 1999; Howarth 2001). There are several 
versions of intergovernmentalism; their common denominator is the focus on national 
interests and the decision-making power of national governments negotiating in 
intergovernmental fora. Intergovernmentalist accounts of EMU have investigated the 
(often competing) interests of the member states that were reconciled in the context of 
EU-level negotiations, which often resulted in convoluted compromises. 
Intergovernmentalist accounts have also considered the different bargaining power of 
the member states, focusing principally on the main member states, notably Germany 
and, to a lesser extent, France.  
 
In the asymmetric ERM / EMS, the German currency (the deutsche mark) was the 
‘anchor’ of the mechanism and the German central bank (the Bundesbank) could 
freely set its monetary policy objectives. The other participating countries had to 
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‘adjust’ their monetary policy by following the decisions of the Bundesbank 
(Kaltenthaler 1998; Loedel 1999). According to intergovernmentalist explanations, 
the establishment of EMU was a way for ‘follower countries’ (especially, France and 
Italy) to end the German dominance of the ERM. In EMU, the policy-makers of these 
countries would have a say in the making of a single monetary policy and have a seat 
at the ECB (Moravcsik 1998; Howarth 2001). The German government had, it can be 
argued, a ‘constrained veto’ power in the context of the negotiations leading to the 
Maastricht Treaty (Bulmer and Paterson 2013). The status quo — the maintenance of 
the asymmetric ERM — was politically impossible given French and other member 
states reform demands. However, the adoption of reforms necessary to transform the 
ERM into a more symmetrical — less German dominated — mechanism was 
politically and economically unacceptable to most of the German economic policy 
making elite, notably the Bundesbank (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). The German 
government was thus ‘constrained’ in its policy options. The move to Monetary 
Union was accepted by Chancellor Helmut Kohl for principally ‘European’ political 
reasons — despite intense opposition from within the German government, the 
Bundesbank and a significant majority of the German public (Dyson and Featherstone 
1999). However, German policy-makers imposed most of the EMU design, centred on 
an independent ECB, independent national central banks and stability-oriented 
macroeconomic policies.  
 
Some intergovernmentalist studies have examined in more detail the domestic 
political economy of EMU in the main member states (Frieden 1996; Oatley 1997; 
Walsh 2000), teasing out the main ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from EMU among national 
economic and socio-economic interests, and hence identifying the main supporters of 
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and opponents to the project. By focusing on the preferences of domestic interest 
groups regarding the main components of EMU (monetary policy, fiscal policy and 
exchange rate policy), these studies have uncovered the social bases underpinning (or 
in certain cases, undermining) EMU, complementing the elite-focused account of the 
intergovernmentalist approaches summarised above.  
 
By combining the main theoretical approaches discussed above, one obtains a multi-
faceted picture of the making of EMU — what Dyson and Featherstone (1999) call a 
‘multi-dimensional chess game’. The main driving forces in the process of European 
monetary integration were functional dynamics resulting from increasing economic 
and monetary interdependence in Europe; the entrepreneurship of supranational 
actors, notably in the Commission, and its president Jacques Delors; and the 
mobilisation of policy-makers in those member states that followed Germany’s 
monetary policy in the EMS, and regarded EMU as an institutional mechanism to 
pool monetary policy making power, rather than de facto ceding it to the Bundesbank. 
However, member states were internally divided on EMU, the establishment of which 
would generate winners and losers at the domestic level. The main obstacles to be 
overcome in the construction of EMU were the reluctance of German policy-makers, 
which had considerable bargaining power because of the economic size of their 
country and because Germany was the ‘hegemon’ in the EMS. Consequently, German 
policy-makers were very influential in shaping the institutional design of EMU. In 
addition to material interests, ideas were also important in the making of EMU, 
facilitating an agreement among national economic policy-making elites and in 
promoting the German-inspired stability-oriented economic paradigm at the core of 
the EMU project.  
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Eventually, the institutional design of EMU agreed in Maastricht was asymmetric, 
whereby full monetary union was not coupled with full economic union (Dyson 2000; 
Hodson 2009). Fiscal Union was notably missing and had deliberately been left out, 
principally (but not exclusively) because of the opposition of German policy-makers 
(Dyson and Featherstone 1999), and despite the half-hearted calls of French policy-
makers for gouvernement économique (Howarth 2001). Moreover, there was some 
debate as to whether the ECB should be responsible (or not) for banking supervision 
in the Euro Area. Due to the opposition of German and French policy-makers, among 
others, prudential supervision remained at the national level (Dyson and Featherstone 
1999). On several issues, compromises among the member states were needed in 
order to move the project forward. For example, the initial formulation of the 
convergence criteria to determine the member states allowed to join the third and final 
stage of EMU was softened during the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
3. Explaining the making of Banking Union 
Mirroring the theoretical debate on the making of EMU, a number of theoretical 
approaches can be applied to the making of BU. A neo-functionalist approach would 
argue that BU was a spill-over from the incomplete EMU, which, combined with a 
supranational governance approach, stresses the importance of supranational 
institutions, notably, the Commission and, especially, the ECB in promoting BU. 
Indeed, several neofunctionalist works have explained shifts in member state 
preferences on Banking Union due to spill-overs from previous economic integration 
(see, for example, Niemann and Ioannou 2015; Epstein and Rhodes 2016), and/or 
have emphasised the pace-setting roles of the ECB and the European Commission (De 
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Rynck 2015; Epstein and Rhodes 2016;  Verdun 2017), as well as the ‘collaborative 
leadership’ between intergovernmental and supranational institutions, especially the 
Presidency of the European Council and the Commission (Nielsen and Smeets 2018). 
Some institutionalist studies have also stressed the path-dependence created by the 
‘incompleteness’ (or ‘asymmetry’) of EMU (Verdun 2015) and by previous 
‘differentiated integration’ related to EMU (Schimmelfennig 2016). 
 
The thrust of the neofunctionalist approach is that BU was the result of spill-overs 
from previous integration, first and foremost, EMU and the Single Market in finance. 
The establishment of EMU supranationalised monetary policy, but left banking 
supervision and resolution at the national level, thanks to the opposition of a number 
of member state governments — including the German and French — during the 
negotiations preceding agreement on the Maastricht Treaty (Dyson and Featherstone 
1999). Moreover, the function of lender of last resort (LLR) for banks, which was 
previously performed by national central banks, was only implicitly transferred to the 
ECB, which, on this issue, maintained a ‘constructive ambiguity’ (Chang 2018).  
 
The sovereign debt crisis can be understood, in part, as a negative spill-over from an 
incomplete EMU (Howarth and Quaglia 2015). The international financial crisis that 
reached its peak in the autumn of 2008 can be seen as an external asymmetric shock 
which hit Euro Area member states in very different ways, and a good number with 
considerable force. At different stages of the crisis, Ireland and Spain were hit 
particularly hard, banks suffered major losses and needed considerable financial 
assistance. In both cases, the state lacked sufficient funds and had to resort to external 
financial assistance from the EU / Euro Area and the International Monetary Fund 
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(IMF). In both cases, fragile banks held worryingly large quantities of home 
government debt. Hence, in Ireland and Spain the banking crisis became a sovereign 
debt crisis. In Greece, persistent fiscal imbalances were at the root of its sovereign 
debt crisis and the need for external financial assistance. Moreover, macroeconomic 
imbalances in Spain and Greece were fuelled by capital inflows intermediated by 
banks, which national policy-makers had been unable (and somewhat unwilling) to 
control (Hall 2014; Matthijs 2016b).  
 
The limited integration of European financial services markets (and, notably, banking 
markets), even after more than a decade of EMU, remained a major weakness in the 
Single Market. The global financial crisis first and the sovereign debt crisis later 
fragmented the single financial market:  banks reduced their cross-border activities 
and variation in the cost of money (i.e., the interest rate paid on bank loans) increased 
considerably across a number of Euro Area member states. In turn, this variation 
disrupted the conduct of the ECB’s monetary policy. The move to establish BU was a 
direct response to market fragmentation and thus should be seen as much in terms of 
reinforcing the Single Market as stabilizing banks and EMU (Howarth and Quaglia 
2016). 
 
As the operation of the ERM had demonstrated in bold relief the Mundell-Fleming 
trilemma for participating member states, an incomplete EMU intensified the 
‘financial trilemma’ for Euro Area member states. Dirk Schoenmaker’s ‘financial 
trilemma’ (2013) examines the interplay of financial stability, international banking 
and national financial policies, arguing that any two of the three objectives can be 
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combined but not all three: one has to give.1 The establishment of EMU made the 
financial trilemma more acute and ultimately untenable in the Euro Area. The 
introduction of the euro and the Financial Services Action Plan substantially increased 
financial integration in the EU — especially cross border banking in the Euro Area — 
but banking supervision and resolution remained at the national level. Furthermore, 
the function of lender of last resort for banks and sovereigns could no longer be 
performed at the national level by the central bank in the Euro Area, and national 
governments (fiscal authorities) were constrained by fiscal rules. The international 
financial crisis was an external shock to financial stability in the Euro Area, but the 
member states no longer had all the instruments to deal effectively with crisis at the 
national level, nor had these instruments been set up at the EU / Euro Area level.  
 
Consequently, the safeguard of financial stability — or the effective minimisation of 
financial instability — could only be achieved effectively at the Euro Area level. For 
these reasons, Euro Area member state governments agreed (in some cases with great 
reluctance) to move to BU. BU was to replace the third element of Schoenmaker’s 
trilemma. These national financial policies include regulation, which, even prior to 
BU was largely set at the EU level; supervision, which for large systemically 
important banks was to be transferred to the European Central Bank (ECB) / SSM in 
BU; resolution, which was to be performed by the SRM in BU; accompanied by the 
creation of the EDIS and the use of the ESM as a common fiscal backstop. BU was 
supposed to address the institutional shortcoming highlighted in Schoenmaker’s 
                                                
1 Schoenmaker’s financial trilemma is problematically conceived in that financial stability can never be 
assured. Rather, the conditions that optimise the likelihood of stability — or, more precisely, minimise 
the likelihood of excessive instability — can be established (Howarth and Quaglia 2016). 
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trilemma by transferring these policies from the national level to the Euro Area (to be 
precise, BU) level (Howarth and Quaglia 2016).  
 
The ECB was the main supranational institution involved in the making of BU 
(Epstein and Rhodes 2016; De Rynck 2015), thus assuming in part the policy 
entrepreneurship performed by the Commission in the making of EMU. Prior to the 
debate on BU, some senior ECB officials (for example, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa) 
had expressed support for the ECB to take over supervisory functions (Howarth and 
Loedel 2005). However, this was not official ECB policy. Carstensen and Schmidt 
(2017) argue that supranational actors, notably the ECB and to a lesser extent the 
Commission, were able to exert ‘institutional and ideational power’ in the second 
stage of the sovereign debt crisis (i.e., from 2012 onwards), which led to the 
establishment of BU. The ECB was a keen supporter of the SSM and SRM, calling 
for a wide scope of application and centralised competences. On several occasions, 
the ECB President reiterated that these mechanisms should not be ‘single’ only in 
name (ECB 2012). The ECB contributed forcefully to the BU debate and was able 
(and willing) to act decisively to save the euro (Glöcker et al., 2016, Draghi 2012). 
 
On the one hand, these functionalist spill-over dynamics contribute to explaining the 
rationale for BU. On the other hand, they do not shed light on the distinctive shape 
that BU took. This is where ideas and intergovernmental dynamics come into play. A 
constructivist approach to the making of BU would examine the ideas or policy 
paradigm underpinning BU to gauge whether an epistemic community was at work. 
Schaffer (2016) combines the ‘constitutive and strategic role of ideas’ to examine the 
making of BU, arguing that ‘ordo-liberal ideas’ were constitutive for German 
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preferences. At the same time, ideas were used as ‘strategic resources by the German 
government’s opponents in order to extract concessions from Germany’ (Schaffer 
2016: 962). In contrast, Matthijs (2016a) stresses the ‘perverse logic’ of German ordo-
liberalism in worsening the sovereign debt crisis, arguing that German policy-makers 
‘undercut their own stated goals’ and made matters worse by sticking to ordo-liberal 
inspired policies, even in the light of clear evidence that these policies were not 
working. 
 
Unlike in the construction of EMU, when stability-oriented ideas had considerable 
impact on the project design agreed, the debate on BU was shaped by competing 
policy paradigms concerning the causes of and solutions to the Euro Area sovereign 
debt crisis. Ordo-liberal or neoliberal economists and policy makers, principally based 
in creditor countries, argued that the crisis originated from the lack of fiscal 
consolidation in euro periphery member states, which had failed to take advantage of 
lower interest rates in EMU to consolidate their fiscal policies and undertake domestic 
structural reforms (Schmidt 2014). The key concern for these creditor country policy 
makers was to design a BU that avoided moral hazard (Dyson 2014), meaning 
perverse incentives that would increase the risk-taking behaviour by member states 
and their banks, should excessively generous support mechanisms with insufficient 
conditionality be included. The solution to the sovereign debt crisis was principally 
fiscal austerity accompanied by structural reforms in debtor countries, and European-
level supervision of debtor country banks and limited conditional financial support for 
both sovereigns and their banks (Howarth and Quaglia 2016). 
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A number of other, mainly Keynesian-inspired, economists (e.g., Paul Krugman) and 
policy makers in debtor countries were critical of low domestic demand in Germany, 
and the high level of its exports to other Euro Area member states (Dyson 2014). 
These economists and policy makers argued that the capital inflows prior to the crisis 
and outflows later were, at least in part, outside the control of the member states hit by 
the crisis, which in turn was worsened by the erratic behaviour of financial markets. 
Since (in their opinion) the problem was not the lack of fiscal discipline in the Euro 
Area periphery, they criticised the ‘orthodoxy’ of austerity, namely fiscal 
retrenchment accompanied by low or no growth (Blyth 2013; Schmidt 2014). The 
main solution for these economists and policy makers was to redress macroeconomic 
imbalances in the Euro Area — with efforts by both creditor and debtor member 
states — and provide financial support to debtor states (and banks in debtor states) 
through BU so as to stave off the worst of the crisis. 
 
These competing policy paradigms shaped the intergovernmental negotiations on BU. 
Obviously though, it was not just a matter of ideas; competing interests were at stake. 
Creditor countries called for domestic austerity in debtor states combined with limited 
Euro Area financial support, which one way or another creditor countries would have 
to underwrite. Debtor states were keen to limit painful austerity measures 
domestically and called for Euro Area financial support. Indeed, the vast majority of 
research investigating the establishment of BU has adopted an intergovernmentalist 
approach which highlights material interests (Donnelly 2014, 2018; Fabbrini 2013; 
Howarth and Quaglia 2016; Schimmelfennig 2015; Schild 2018).  
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Intergovernmental accounts of BU focus principally upon the competing preferences 
of Euro Area member states — normally, understood in terms of underlying macro-
economic interests — which had to be reconciled through EU negotiations. This 
reconciliation involved a number of convoluted compromises in the design of BU, 
most famously in the design of the SRM (Howarth and Quaglia 2016). 
Intergovernmentalist accounts have also considered the different bargaining power of 
the member states, generally focusing on the role and preferences of the main 
countries, notably Germany and, to a lesser extent, France. French policy-makers — 
joined with the European Commission and debtor member states in the euro periphery 
— pushed for the construction of large-scale support mechanisms able to purchase 
debt directly from Euro Area member states and engage in bank recapitalisation. In 
return for support mechanisms, debtor member states were willing — in most cases 
with immense reluctance — to accept the supranationalisation of banking supervision 
(Howarth and Quaglia 2016). Thus, the interests of French and Southern European 
policy-makers in BU stemmed above all from a desire to establish a kind of financial 
backstop to the Euro Area via a lender-of-last-resort-style support for banks — in 
addition to ECB action — rather than governments.  
 
German and a number of other creditor member state policy-makers sought to 
establish clear limits to their financial assistance for ailing banks and governments in 
countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis. They also made clear that the acceptance of 
joint liabilities for banks in the Euro Area should be preceded by the 
supranationalisation of banking supervision in order to ensure more effective control 
of banks in the euro periphery. These policy makers also sought a comprehensive 
assessment of large Euro Area banks to pre-date the operation of the SSM to 
 17 
determine which banks had so-called ‘legacy problems’ that precluded subsequent 
Euro Area support. German policy makers did not want to support ailing banks in the 
euro periphery with built up problems due to previous national regulation and 
supervision that they perceived to be inadequate (Schild 2018).  
 
This intergovernmental debate on BU paralleled long-standing debates on Euro Area 
governance and the quest for solutions to the sovereign debt crisis. The French-led 
coalition, which included Southern European countries, sought support mechanisms, 
stressing the importance of ‘solidarity’. The German-led coalition, which included 
Austria, the Netherlands and Finland, sought reinforced fiscal policy commitments 
(sustainable member state budgets), stressing the need to avoid ‘moral hazard’.  
 
The different preferences of the member states generated distributional conflicts that 
had to be reconciled through intergovernmental bargaining. The outcomes of the 
negotiations were the result of compromises between the interests and ideas of 
different member states, but were often closer to the preferences of the most powerful 
player, Germany which had a ‘constrained veto power’ (Bulmer and Paterson 2013; 
Bulmer 2014). Its power resulted from the size and relative stability of its economy 
and its banking system. This power was however constrained because Germany had a 
clear economic and political interest in avoiding major disruptions to EMU and the 
collapse of the Euro Area. In fact, even in its ‘light’ version, BU implied forms of 
limited fiscal solidarity, which in the end Germany came to accept. 
 
Domestic political economy differences reflected in national banking systems also 
directed member state preferences on the elements of BU. Germany with its non-
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concentrated and diverse banking system containing a large number of smaller public 
law (alternative) banks sought to limit ECB supervision to only the largest entities. 
Germany, with banking groups supported by well-funded joint liability schemes also 
sought to limit the potential reach of the SRM and opposed the creation of the EDIS 
which — according to Commission proposals — would call upon German bank funds 
to supply a European mechanism (Howarth and Quaglia 2016). German policy 
makers feared that German banks would end up having to pay off the depositors and 
bond holders of Italian (etc.) banks given the inadequate funding of Italian (etc.) 
deposit and resolution schemes. France, with its more concentrated banking sector, 
opposed uneven ECB supervision and sought ‘indirect’ ECB supervision via national 
authorities. France, with its underfunded bank deposit guarantee scheme, supported 
the EDIS. 
	
 
To sum up, as with the establishment of EMU, several theoretical approaches can be 
deployed and combined to explain the move to and design of BU. Indeed, several 
accounts have sought to combine various approaches. For example, some authors 
(Börzel and Risse 2018; Quaglia and Spendzharova 2017) have combined liberal 
intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, in order to account for the move to BU. 
Jones et al. (2016) have used a two-step approach, arguing that negative spill-overs 
from previous incomplete integration in EMU triggered the sovereign debt crisis. This 
was followed by intergovernmental negotiations, which paved the way for the 
establishment of BU.  
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We build on these works, arguing that an incomplete EMU generated spill-overs that 
provided the rationale to propose BU. As opposed to the negotiations leading to the 
EMU project, the European Commission played only a limited role (Hodson 2013). 
Rather, the ECB can be seen as the important supranational policy entrepreneur that 
pushed most actively for BU. There were competing paradigms at work in the 
negotiations and the design of BU. These competing ideas were often aligned with 
different economic interests of the member states, which in turn reflected different 
national banking systems.  
 
4. Theoretical lessons from EMU and BU 
There are three main theoretical lessons from this comparison of the making of EMU 
and BU. First, there are obvious parallels between the neofunctionalist dynamics 
leading to both projects. Spill-over, to be understood in terms of the Mundell-Fleming 
trilemma and Padoa-Schioppa’s more problematic ‘inconsistent quartet’, generated 
pressures in favour of establishing EMU. Similarly, once an incomplete EMU was 
established, Schoenmaker’s financial trilemma generated spill-over pressure to 
complete EMU by establishing BU. The move to both BU and EMU can also be 
interpreted through the lens of the so-called ‘bicycle theory’ of European integration, 
whereby the EU has to move forward in order not to fall apart because of intensifying 
economic and political pressures created by existing institutional and policy 
frameworks (see also Jones et al. 2016). This meant tackling the economically and 
politically problematic asymmetry of the EMS and, more recently, the sovereign debt 
crisis and EMU asymmetry. The move to BU did not fundamentally address the 
causes of the crisis, but its intensity was possibly diminished. In order to lower the 
risk of financial instability and reverse the fragmentation of the Single Market in 
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finance, Euro Area policy-makers moved to promote the completion of EMU by 
establishing BU, transferring banking supervision and resolution (only in part) to the 
Euro Area level. These spill-over dynamics and path-dependence created by monetary 
integration in the 1980s, in the one case, and the 2000s, in the other, were exploited 
by supranational policy entrepreneurs, respectively the Commission and the ECB.  
 
The second theoretical lesson to draw from this comparison of the move to EMU and 
BU is the ongoing importance of the member states, their interests, and their relative 
bargaining power. Although spill-over pressures for EMU and BU are undeniable, the 
agreements on their establishment and design were very much driven by 
intergovernmental dynamics. There are clear parallels in the intergovernmentalism of 
EMU and BU. The former was promoted by follower countries as a way to move 
beyond Germany’s hegemonic position in the ERM of the EMS. German policy-
makers, who had a strong bargaining position and worried about the moral hazard 
created by a single currency and monetary policy largely dictated the design of EMU:   
a full Monetary Union centred on a powerful independent central bank, with a very 
limited form of Economic Union focused principally on a restrictive understanding of 
sustainable fiscal policy. 
 
As with the making of EMU, a version of BU — one that emphasised support 
mechanisms — was promoted by France and Euro Area member states hit hardest by 
the sovereign debt crisis as a way to tackle the crisis and boost confidence in 
international financial markets. German policy on the elements of BU was directed by 
moral hazard concerns and Germany was in a stronger bargaining position because it 
was considerably less affected by the sovereign debt crisis, despite the exposure of 
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some German banks to Southern Europe. Germany was however indirectly affected 
by the crisis, which threatened the very survival of the euro. For this reason, German 
policy-makers reluctantly agreed to BU. However, as with EMU, they were able to 
impose most of the BU design:  on the SSM — no ECB direct supervision of small 
banks — the SRM — national veto on the mutualisation of resolution funds — the 
absence of an EDIS (to date) and a limited fiscal backstop subject to tight 
conditionality. This asymmetric configuration of BU caused asymmetric effects 
across and within the member states, and partly explains why the sovereign debt crisis 
simmers and a future crisis looms. 
 
The third theoretical lesson to draw is that on BU as with EMU there were competing 
policy paradigms at stake in intergovernmental debates over design. These ideas were 
often in line with the domestic political economy concerns of the national policy 
makers who proposed them. The main pre-occupation of stability-oriented countries 
was to establish a system that would limit moral hazard. Consequently, German 
negotiators insisted upon inserting ‘no bail-out’ and ‘no monetary financing’ clauses 
into the Maastricht Treaty (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). They opposed any step 
towards fiscal federalism or ‘transfer union’, fearing that Germany would end up 
becoming the main contributor, as it always had been in total net terms to the EU 
budget. German policy-makers also successfully demanded convergence criteria that 
countries had to meet in order to be able to join EMU and then, in 1994, proposed the 
SGP, the objective of which was to avoid excessively loose national fiscal policies in 
EMU (Heipertz and Verdun 2010). 
 
 22 
To diminish the likelihood of moral hazard, creditor countries (notably, Germany) 
sought to establish clear limits to their financial assistance to ailing banks and debtor 
member state governments hit by the sovereign debt crisis — this accounts for the 
limited scope of the SRM, the failure to agree the EDIS (to date), and the limited 
amount of ESM funds and their conditional use. By contrast, France and debtor states 
were keen to ease the impact of austerity and set in place mechanisms for financial 
solidarity or burden sharing in the Euro Area. The parallel with current debates on the 
creation of a Euro Area budget is great. Germany and other creditor member states 
have been reluctant to allow the creation of anything beyond a small Euro Area 
budget funded through the main EU budget and they insist upon heavy conditionality 
attached to any financial support provided. France and the euro periphery member 
states call for the creation of a large Euro Area budget separate from the EU budget as 
an essential move to decrease uneven adjustment costs linked to EMU asymmetry and 
ensure the survival of the Euro Area. Plus ça change. 
 
Conclusion 
The agreement on BU can be seen as a response to the asymmetric design of EMU — 
a Monetary Union with a limited form of Economic Union — and to the 
fragmentation of the Single Market in financial services. BU was also a crisis-driven 
attempt to address several important issues that were sidestepped or papered over 
during the negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty — principally the allocation 
of supervisory responsibilities to the ECB and the creation of a fiscal backstop for the 
Euro Area. Other closely related issues — notably, the reinforcement of the single 
rule book on banking and the harmonization of national deposit guarantee schemes — 
stemmed from the incomplete nature of the Single Market in financial services. The 
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Franco-German debates on BU paralleled longstanding debates on Euro Area 
governance and solutions to the sovereign debt crisis. The French sought support 
mechanisms; the Germans demanded reinforced rules and rule-following. 
 
Neofunctionalism is a useful theoretical framework to understand the dynamics — 
created by functional and cultivated spill-over — that encouraged member state 
governments to consider and then accept the move to both EMU and BU. Without 
these dynamics neither project would have been adopted. Intergovernmentalism is 
more helpful to explain the design of the EMU and BU projects agreed by member 
state governments. German preferences largely, but not entirely, explain the 
asymmetric design of the two projects — more on Monetary Union and less on 
Economic (fiscal) Union, more on the SSM and less on the other elements of BU.  
 
In the intergovernmental negotiations leading to both EMU and BU, Germany 
possessed a ‘constrained veto power’, which involved having to accept significant 
compromises in order to meet other political and macro-economic goals. Liberal 
intergovernmentalism points to the importance of microeconomic interests — large 
exporters and banks respectively — and the need to consider domestic political 
economy concerns to understand German and French preferences on EMU and BU. 
Constructivism attracts our attention to the importance of ordo-liberal ideas — a 
preoccupation with both price stability and moral hazard — that drove German 
policies and largely shaped the institutional design of both projects. The spread of 
these ideas to other member states — more in the case of EMU than with BU — made 
compromises with France and debtor / euro periphery member states possible, 
resulting in asymmetric versions of both EMU and BU. 
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